ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

equally imposed or e:forcedl upon every person immigrating to
such state from aly other foreign country, .and any law of any
state in conflict with this provision is hereby declared null and
void." (16 Statutes at Large 144.)
By the term charge, as here used, is meant any onerous condition, it being the evident intention of the act to prevent any
such condition from being imposed upon any person immigrating
to the country, which is not equally imposed upon all other immigra:ts, at least upon all others of the same class. It was passed
Wider and accords with the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment,. A
co,,dition which makes the right of the immigrant to land depend
upnn the execution of a bond by a third party, not under his control and whom he cannot constrain by any legal proceedings, and
whose execution of the bond can only be obtained upon such terms
as he may exact, is as onerous as any charge which can well be
imposed, and must, if valid, generally lead, as in the present case,
to the exclusion of the immigrant.
The statute of California which we have been considering imposes this onerous condition upon persons of particular classes on
their arrival in the ports of the state by vessel, but leaves all other
foreigners of the same classes entering the state in any other way,
by land from the British possessions or Mexico, or over the plains
by railway, exempt from any charge. The statute is therefore in
direct conflict with the Act of Congress.
It follows, from views thus expressed, that the petitioner must
be discharged from further restraint of her liberty; and it is so
ordered.
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taken p ace, whereby the plaintiff was induced to buy of the defendant
an interest in a certain patent-right, and was thereby damnified. Held,
that the defendant was liable therelbr in an action on the case. Somers
v. Richards, 46 Vt.
In an action on the case, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove
all the allegations of the declaration as to the means used by the defendant in doing the act complained of, provided less than all are sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, and what are proved are sufficieut: 1d.
COMPOSITION DEED.

See Debtor and Creditor

CONTEMPT. See Reced er.
Disregardof Order of Court-Ignorance-Impossbilityof Cop liance.-In general a party to a suit will not be adjudged in contempt therein for any act or omission which occurred before the suit was commenced
or before service of the process alleged to have been disregarded : Witter
v. Lyon and others, .34 Wis.
An order to show cause why a party should not be punished for a
contempt, obtained on exparte affidavits and 'other prootf, may be discharged on evidence of the same kind produced by the party against
whom such order was granted; or the court may allow written interrogatories to be filed by the party moving for such order, and require
specific answers to be made thereto under oatl : Id.
Plaintiffs obtained an injunction restraining defendants from removing
certain bonds beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and requiring theni
to deposit such bonds with the treasurer of this state. Afterwards
they procured an order upon defendants to show cause why they should
not be punished for a contempt in disobeying such injunction ; and defendants answered that the bonds had been removed and deposited in
Chicago before any process was served upon them in the action, that it
was impossible for them to acquire possession or control of the bonds so
as to comply with the mandate of the court. Held, that the court did
not err in discharging the order upon this.answer and affidavits filed in
support-thereof: Id.
CONTRACT. See Debtor and Creditor.
Imtplied Obligations on both Parties-Damagesfor Prevention of
Performane.-In an action for damages, the plaintiffs alleged in the
declaration that they had agreed with the defendant to build him a house
for which he agreed to pay them a certain price ; that, in pursuance of
said agreement, they began to build the house and were ready and willing to complete it, but that the defendant prqhibited and forcibly prevented them from so doing, and compelled them to desist from the work.
Another count set forth the contract and the work done under it by the
plaintiffs in detail, and alleged that the plaintiffs were then and there
ready, willing, and anxious to comply with the contract in every particular, but were prevented from so doing by the defendant. Verdict
being for the plaintiffs ; upon appeal from an order overruling a motion
in arrest of judgment, Hel: 1st. That from this contract an obligation
by the defendant to suffer the house to be built was implied. 2d. That
though the defendant had the right to stop work on the building, yet,
by so doing, he committed a breach of contract and incurred a liability
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to pay the damages that might result therefrom. 3d. That the damages
in such ease would include coinpensatibn for the labor done and materials furnished, and such further sum as might, by legal principles, be'
assessed for the breach of the contract. 4th. That'though the declaration omitted in terms to aver the implied promise of the defendant and
was not very technical in stating the breach thereof, yet the fact of prevention was alleged as the breach, and this was sufficient; especially
after verdict, which is aided by intendment: Black v. Woodrow tind
Richardson, 39 Md.
CORPORATION.

Conversion of Bonds into Stock -A railroad company, having a capital stock of $1,500,000- with power, by its charter to increase-she stAekto any necessary amount, and with authority to allow and pay interest
on its stock, issued its bonds, bearing interest payable semi-annually,
and containing a provision that the bonds might, within a specified time,
be converted into stock of the road at the option of the holder. IntereA
was accordingly allowed to the stockholders up to the date of the first
dividend, and -was paid by issuing to the rnew stock ; the sum so paid,
however, not exceeding the net earnings of the road during the time
named. , Hed, that a bondholder, who had been regularly paid the
interest on his bonds up to the time of the dividend, and who then
elected to convert his bonds into stock, was only entitled to receive stock
to the amount of the principal sum specified in the bonds, and could
claim no part of the new stock so issued by the company; nor any compensation or allowance, in stock or otherwise, on account thereof: Sut[if v. C. and Kf. Railroad Lo., 24 Ohio St.
COVENANT.

Effect of Recital in Charter-LegislativeGrant-Esippd by DeedPresumption of .Identityof Persons of same Name.-The charter of
Harris Gore was dated October 30th 1801, and recited that the grant
of said territory was made by the legislature, February 25th 1782, to
G. and others. On June 1st 1789, G., by. deed of .warranty, conveyed
"one whole right and share in said gore, drawn in my name to me," to
G. Jr. The lands of said gore were not in fact allotted or divided till
the year 1802. ifebl, that the recital of the grant in the charter, wYas
at least primdfacie evidence of the fact; and that said grant at once
vested title to said lands in the grantees, as effectually as when engrossed
and recorded: Oross v. Martin, 46 Vt.
When one having no title to land, conveys it with covenants of warranty, and subsequently acquires title thereto, his title enures to, and
vests in, his grantee, by operation of law, in discharge of his covenants:
rt .
. Parties in successive deeds constituting a chain of title, of the same
name, are presumptively the same persons; and in this country, there is
no intendment that a party, in twenty years, may not change his residence: Id.
A deed from G. of H., to G. Jr. of H., was presumed to be from father
to son: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.

Discharge of Jury before Verdict.-In a criminal cause, the discharge
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of the jury without the consent of the defendant, after it has been duly
impannelled and sworn, but before verdict, is equivalent to a verdict of
acquittal, unless the discharge was ordered in consequence tofsuch necessity asthe law regards as imperative: Hines v. State 24 Ohio St.
In such case, the record eust show the existence of the necessity
which required the discharge of the jury ; otherwise, the delendant will
be exonerated fromn the liability of further answering to the indictment:
Al.
'rncipai,nd Accessory.-One who, participating in the felonious
intent, is present, aiding and abetting the commission of a murder, or
other fchmny, is a principal, although not himself the immediate perpetrator of the act.: Wrden v.State, 24 Ohio St.
The presence, either actual or constructive, of the accused at the
commission.Qf a.felony, is not a necessary ingredient in the offence of
aiding. abetting or procuring another to commit it, defined by section
36 of the Crimes Act: Id.
DAMAGES. See Contract.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Composition-Rescission of Contract-Rights of other 1'artics..Where it appars clearly that one entered into a contract under a bond
fide mistake, ignorance or forgetfulness of facts material thereto, he
may avoid or rescind the contract on that ground, provided the rights
of innocent third parties will not be prejudiced by such avoidance:
Johnson v. Parker,34 Wis.
In such a case it is not material to inquire whether such person might
not, by reasonable diligence, have ascertained the facts which he had forgotten, or in regard to which he was so mistaken or in ignorance: Id.
But where several creditors have agreed with their debtor to compromise their claims against him at a stipulated rate, each agreeing to
such compromise upon consideration of the like agreement of the others,
no one of them can avoid or rescind such agreement on his part upon
the ground that it was made through mistake, forgetfulness or ignorance
as to the amount-or situation of his claim, or the manner in which it
was secured : Id.
There is a eonclusive presumption'of law in such cases that the setting
aside of such a settlement, Jiifavor of one creditor, upon any of the
grounds named, would be injurious to the other creditors; and the debtor
may avail himself of the objection, in a suit against him alone, because
that is a necessary means of protecting such other creditors: id.
It is not necessary to entitle crcditorp to the protection of this rule,
-that they should have convened, or that a formal promi.e should have
.been made by each to all the others to abide by the settlement. It is
sufficient that they have communicated with each other through the
debtor, by accepting his proposition in writing made in the same f'orn:
to each, from which it appears that the consideration for the promise of
each was the like promise made by the others: Id.
DEED. See Covenant.
Repugnant Descriptions.-Where land was described in a deed of
conveyance s lying north of a specified road, and was also described by
boundary lines, which include the road-bed: Held, that the repugnancy
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between the two descriptions is not irreconcilable, and that the road-bed
is included in tile conveyance : Williams et al v. Sparks, 21 Ohio St.
DOWER.

See Husband and Wfe.
EQUITY.

Iijnction of other Proceelings in Equity.-A court of equity will
not interfere by injunction to stay proceedings in another equitable suit
in the sante court: D ,yton v. Rd!, 34 Wis.
The action to forecloic, by the tax title claimant against the original
owner, provided by oh. 22, is equitable in its nature; and if the
defendant therein is entitled, under ch. 89, t4 the five years' term
for redemption, which has not yet expired, that fict shoild be set up in
the sa:ne action; and a separate suit to restrain upon that ground the
foreclosure actiouaeannot.be.maintained : Id.
ESTOPPEL.

See Covenant; Municipal Corporation.

EVIDENCE.

See Covenant; Sale.

Testimony of Deceasel WTtness.-Where the defendant in a suit, testifyinig to what a deceased witness -has proved on a former trial df the
same cause, stated that he could give substantially the 'testijmony of the
deciised witness as to a certain point, but could not give all his testimony
as to a certain other point. Held, That this evidence could not be admitted: Blac7 v. Richardson, 39 Md.
Proof of Han'lwritinV-Rece4it.-A witness, to prove handwriting,
must have such knowledge of it as to enable him to form some opinion
of its genuineness when he sees it: Guyette v. Bolton, 46 Vt.
A receipt in full of a demand named therein, is a full and pe'rfect
primafacie defence to an action for the recovery thereof, and- casts upon
the plaintiff the burden of explaininga it, or in some way destroying its
Id.
effect as evidence:
Expert.-See. 14, p. 711, Tay. Stats., which provides that no person
"practising physic and surgery" in this state shall "testify in a professional capacity as a physician and.surgeon in any case, unless such
person shall have received a diploma," &o., applies only to cases in which
such persons are called 'upon to testify to their opinions as experts:
Montgomery v. Town of Scott, 34 Wis.
In an action for injuries to plaintiff's person alleged to have been
caused by a defective highway, a witness for plaintiff, not shown to have
received such diploma, was permitted to testify that "both bones of
plaintiff's leg were broken three. fingers wide above the ankle." It
afterwards appeared that the witness set and dressed the leg. Hel,
that as the fact testified to was not one requiring professional skill for
its determination, and the witness was not called upon to expreps any
opinion as an expert, there was no error in receiving the testimony : Id.
A physician examined as an expert may tstify as to the probable
effects of wounds and injuries upon the future general health ; as, in
this case, to plaintiff's liability to paralysis from the injured limb: Id.
FORMER ACTION.
Effect of a Judment for the Contract Price, as a Bar to the Subseguent Recovery of Damagesfor a Breach of the Contract.-The defend-
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ant contracted to dig a cellar and lay a cellar-wall for the plaintiff by
a certain time, at a certain price; but did not complete it within the
time; whereby the plaintiff suffered damage. After the job was finished,
the defendant brought suit against the plaintiff, to recover the balance
of the contract price due for the work, and recovered judgment by default for the full amount thereof, and collected said judgment. Afterwards, the plaintiff brought this action to recover his damages for the
breach of said contract. Held, that said judgment and the satisfhction
thereof, were not a bar to the plaintiff's right of recovery : Davenport
Vt.
v. Hubbard,46
Gilson et at. v. Bingham, 43 Vt. 410, commented upon and explained:
Id.
HIGHWAY.

Liability of Oity for Defects in-Presumptilns.-The liability of a
city for injuries to the person resulting from a defective sidewalk which
the city was bound to repair, is settled and no longer open to discussion
in this court: Colby and Wife v. O'ty of Beaver Dam, 34 Wis.
The charter of the defendant city (P. & L. Laws of 1871. cl. 224).
after conferring upon the common council expressly the power to direct
the manner in which sidewalks shall be constructed in the first instance
by the lot-owner, and to cause them 'to be built if the latter shall neglect
to do so, further provides that "whenever the street commissioner shall
deem it necessary to repair any sidewalk constructed by said city within
its limits," he shall direct the owner or occupant of the adjoining lot to
make such repair in a time and nmanner to be prescribed by the conimissioner, and in case of his neglect, shall cause the same to be made
at the expense of the lot, &c. Held, 1. That the power to direct repairs
here given extends to all sidewalks which the city has ordered to" be
built, and over which it exercises care and control. 2. That under this
charter the city is bound to repair any defect in iuch a walk, which
endangers the safety of travellers : Id.
There was no error in instrudting the jury that if the defect in a sidewalk which caused the injury complained of, had existed for such a
length of time that by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence the
city authorities would have discovered it, knowledge on their part might
be presumed; there being evidence which rendered such instruction
pertinent: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Ante-Nuptial Agreement-Barring of Dower and Homestead.-The
plaintiff was the second wife of the intestate, who died wit.hout issue of
their marriage. An ante-nuptial agreement was entered into between
them, whereby a pecuniary provision was made for her in lieu of dower,
and whereby she covenanted to claim no sha'e in his estate otherwise
than according to the provisions of said agreenment. The plaintiff did
not elect to waive the provision made for her by said agreement, but,
induced by the fraud an'd artifice of the only son and sole heir of the
intestate, accepted and received the same in full of all claim against said
estate, and retained the same without offering to restore it to the estate.
Hed, that the plaintiff was thereby barred of dower and homestead:
Hathaway v. Hathaway's Estate, 46 Vt.
Held, also; that without waiver of said provision, and notice of it in
writing, the Probate Court had no power to decree the plaintiff home-
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stead and dower, although said provision was wholly inadequate for her
support: Id.
The Probate Court, on the plaintiff's application, caused homestead
and dower to be set out to her, from which proceeding this appeal was
taken. Held, that although such proceeding might be considered as
equivalent to a decision that said provision was not sufficient for h~r

support, and to an extension of the time for making election ; yet, that it
could notsupply the indispensable requisites of election, waiver, and notice
thereof in writing to the Probate Court-acts to be done by the plaintiff:
Id.
INJUNCTION. -See E4uity.
INSURANCE..

.

.

Assignment of Policy of Insurance-Aignee takes subject to Eguities --The assignee of a policy of insurance takes it subject to all the
equities which att-ich to it in the hands of the insured; And on a suit
by the assignee the insurer has a right to claim any set-off, or make any
defence he could have made against the insured at the time of notice of
assignment: Johnson v. Ptwziz Insurance ao., 39 Md.
If the insurer assent to 'the assignmeiit or by his act or conduct
induces the assignee to take the same, under the belief that no claim
exists against the insured, then no such defence or set-off could be relied
on in a suit by the assignee: Id.
G. insured a cargo of shooks with the P. Ins. Co.-The shooks arrived
in a damaged condition, and it was agreed to sell them at auction and
adjust the loss. G. wrote a note to the agent of the insurance company

transferring to J.B. & Co. the settlement of the insurance as soon as
arrangements were made with the auctioneer to sell thelu. iathis the
agent endorsed "the net proceeds of sales of the within-named' shboks
would come in the usual course to Mr. G-., but in accordance with his
request I will arrange with B. & Co. (the auctioneers,) to hold the
amount for your (J.B. & Co.'s) account." The loss on the shooks was
determined by an adjhster to be $905.16. Afterwards the P. Ins. Co.
sued J. B & Co. as guarantors on a note of G., growing out of an independent transaction, and the defendants proposed to set off against the

plaintiff's claim the $905.16, which was alleged to be due to the defendants
under the above assignmpnt. Held: 1st. That the endorsement of the
plaintiff's agent did not recognise the right of the defendants to $905.16,
but to the proceeds arising from the sale. 2d. That the plaintiff's
right to set-off against G.'s claim for $905.16 a sum due it, was superior
to any claim which the defendants had on the $905.16 in virtue of
the above assignment: Id.
MORTGAGE.

Agreement to treat as Security only.-The stipulation in a mortgage,
that it is not to be foreclosed until the property of the makers of the
note, which it is given to secure, is exhausted, is complied with, where,
after judgment on the note against the makers, it appears they have no

property subject to execution.

The creditor is not bound to bring suit

to exhaust the equities of the judgment-debtors, before foreclosing the
mortgage : Riblet v. Davis et al., 24 Ohio St.
An execution issued on a judgment by confession, was levied on the
goods of one of the judgment debtors, on whose application the judg-
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ment was modified and the execution set aside, whereby the goods
were lost to the judgment-creditor. Held, that in the absence of fraud
or collusion on the part of the creditor, his right to recover the whole
am:unt of tile debt of a co-surety of such judgment-debtor was not affected by the discharge of the levy: Id.
3l UN ICIPAL CORPORATION. See Highway; Negligence.
Improvement of Street-Jurisdictionof Counwis.-Where the charter
of a city authorizes the common council to improve a street at the expense of adjfining lots,, only upon presentation to it of a petition for such
improvement signed by the owners of a certain specified proportion of
the lot frontage on such street, the presentation of such petition, bearing the names, as signers, of persons actually owning the required proportion 9f uch Jot.'frontage, which names haxe been actually signed by
those persons ihemselves or by their authority, is essential to give the
council jurisdiction : Canfield v. Smith, 34 Wis.
Where the improvement has been made by the council without such
petition, the owner of a lot assessed therefor, and sodd for non-paymnent
of the assessment, is entitled (where he has int estopped himself in any
way from demanding such relief) to a judgment in equity declaring void
the certificate of such sale and restraining the issue, of a deed thereon:
Id.
Where, in such a case, there was a petition presented to the council
purporting to be signed by persons owning the required proportion of
frontage on said street, the plaintiff, under a complaint which merely
alleges that " no petition was ever presented by the owners of" such
proportion of frontage, may show that some of the signers of said peti.
tion did not own the amount of frontage claimed by them, and that the
oames of other" appearing as signers were not affixed by themselves nor
with their consent: Id.
The plaintiff (who was not one of the signers of said petition) is not
estopped from alleging a want of power in the conimon council by the
fAct that, having notice that the work was ordered, he did not interpose
the objection until the work was done: Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See Evidence; Highway; Railroad.
Vontributory.-Where the carelessness of the plaintiff, as well as that
of the defendant operated directly to produce the injury complained of,
the plaintiff has no right to recover. And in a case where the defendant is entitled to and requests a charge to that effect, the refusal or
neglect of the court to so instruct the jury, in unambiguous terms, is
error, for which a judgment in favor of the plaintiff will be reversed : Pittsburgh, F. W. & C. Railway Co. v. Krichbaum's Adm'r., 24 Ohio
St.
Contributory Negligence in Law-Liabiliy of a Municipal Corporation for Injury resultingfrom Obstructionof a treet.-Negligence is the
want of such care as men of ordibary prudence would use under similar
circumstances; and the question as to whether the act of a party
amounts in law to negligence, depends upon Ithe danger which might
reasonably be expected to result therefrom : .Mayor, etc, v. Holmes, 39
Md.
In July 1872, the City of Baltimore, through its water department,
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was engaged in laying water-mains along a portion of the west side of
Charles street, the whole work, including excavating and repaving, being
done in five days. The plaintiff was employed to haul material from a
house on the west side of Charles street above Saratoga street, and, coming to the house on the 4th of July for a load, found a ridge of stones,
Occasioned by the work referred to, along the west side of the street in
front of and beyond the house. At this time he made no attempt to
cross over the stones, but, stopping his horse 'on the east side of the
street. carried the 'Materials, with the assistance of persons working in
the house, to the cart. On the 8th of July, the street being obstructed
as before, he made his first load in the same manner, but on his-return
for a second load, not finding any one to hblp him, and the materials
being heavy, he attempted to lead his horse over the stones. While so
doing, the horse stumbled, and in falling struck the plaintiff on the leg
and broke it. The horse was sound and steady, and the plaintiff was
leading him carefully. The plaintiff having brought suit against the
city for damages, the defendant offered evidence that the plaintiff had
been cautioned by -the owner of the materials to be careful in crossing
the ridge, because he thought it was dangerous; and that the work which
caused the obstruction had been carefully and promptly done by experienced and competent workmen. At the trial the court submitted the
question of negligence, both on the part of the plaintiff and defendant,
to the jury ; verdict and judgment being for the plaintiff, on appeal by
the defendant, it was Held that this instruction was proper, the act of
the plaintiff not being contributory negligence in law : .d.
N'.W TRIAL.

After-dicovered Evidenc.-A new trial should not be granted on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, unless the legitimate effect of
such evidence, when 6onsidered in connection with that produced on
the trial, ought to have resulted in a different verdict or finding. The
rule of practice, on this subject, was not substantially changed by section 297 of the code of civil procedure: Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Long, 24 Ohio St.
RAILROAD. See Tort.
Evidence in Action for Injury by -ire occaroned by one of its Engines
- Onus Probandi.-Inan action against a railroad company for so negligently managing one of its engines, that certain cord-wood and growing timber of the plaintiff whose land adjoined the road, was destroyed
by fire emitted from the engine, the plaintiff, for the purpose of proving
that the fire in question was occasioned by the defendant's engine, and
as tending to prove negligence on the part of the defendant in the construction and management of its engines, may show that within a week
before the fire in question, the engines of the defendant in passing had
scattered large sparks which were capable of setting fire to combustible
articles along the road, and that frequent fires, occasioned by such sparks,
that time: Annapois and Elkridgt Railroad
had been put out within
39 Md.
Company v. Gantt.
Under Article 77 of the Code, in an action against a railroad company
for injury done the property of the plaintiff by fire occasioned by the
engines of the defendant, it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove
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that the fire was caused by the defendant's negligence; but the onus is
cast on the defendant to show affirmatively thiat it has used reasonable
care to prevent the causing of injury by fire from its engines : I.
In an action under the Code, against a railroad company for injury
done to certain cord-wood and growing timber of the plaintiff, by fire occasioned by the engine of the defendant, the fact that the fire began on
the track of the railroad and spread thence to the plaintiff's land adjoining, causing the injury to his property, will not avoid the liability of the
railruad company. the evidence showing that the injury was the direct
consequence of the fire occasioned by the defendant's engine : Id.
The afe rule as to the liability of railroad companies under Article
77 of the Code, for damages by fire occasioned by their engines or carriages, is that when their liability arises, it extends to all the near and
natural consequences of their wrongful act, and not to those which are
remote, incidental or exceptional: I.
In a case where the fire has not been communicated directly to the
plaintiff's property by sparks or cinders from! the locomotive of the defendant; as where it has spread from its first beginning, and thus been
communicated indirectly, to the*plaintiff's property, it is a question
.proper to be submitted to the jury to determine from all the facts of the
case, whether the injury complained of is the natural consequence of the
•defendant's negligence, or whether it has been caused by "some intervening force or power which stands naturally as the cause of the misfortune :" Id.
RECEIVER.
tie of-Protection by the Court-Contempt.-A final order in a
proceeding for contempt is appealable : Matter of Day, on Complaint
of Benton, Receiver, 34 Wis.
Where property is legally in possession of a receiver appointed by the
court, it is the duty of the court to protect his possession, not only
.-against violence but against suits at law: I.
* By agreement between the parties in interest, one-fourth of the shin-gles manufactured from certain lumber at a certain mll were to be
delivered by the mill-owners, as the property of E. & B. to X., who had
been appointed by the court "receiver of all moneys, assets and property" of said E. & B. ; and the mill-owners afterwards delivered certain
shingles made from such lumber to X., as a part of the obe-four.h belonging to said firm. Held, that X. was lawfully in possession of such
shingles as receiver, and that if there had been a mistake in such
delivery, and the shingles belonged in fact to D., the only remedy of the
latter was by application to the court for redress, or for leave to sue ;
and he could not lawfully take possession of the shingles and convert
them to his own use: Id.
In 'a proceeding against D. for a contempt in taking such shingles
from theteceiver's possession, where it appeared that he had sold them
and they had been removed from the state, the court did not err in
finding the value and ordering D. to pay the same to the receiver; nor
in further ordering that he be allowed to de uet from such value the
amount paid by him for manufacturing the shingles; nor in appointing
a referee to determine and report the amount so paid : Id.
The regeiver's title or ultimate right of possession could not be tri3d
in such a proceeding by him for contempt, bu only in some appropriate.
action to be iistituted against him: Id.
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SALE.

arranty-Rescission-Evidence-In

an action to rescinda contract

and cancel promissory notes given for the right to use and sell a

"

patent

screw-fork for elevating hay, grain, straw. &c.,"representationsmade by
the vendor "that the fork was in all respects a good one; that it wouid
do good work, and would work in all kinds of hay, grain, straw, and1
other grass, and was in all respects fit for the use intended,"-held to
amount to a warranty : Elk-ins v. Kenyon and others, 34 Wis.
If the instrument was one of no practical utility for the use intended,
the pl.tintiff was entitled to a rescission of the contract on the ground oft
false and fraudulent representations : Id.
Inthe case of such an instrument, whose value depends upon the
ability of farmers generally to use it successfully, if numerous witnesses
of that class testify that they have given it a full, fair and exhaustive
trial, and were unable to make it work, and others testify that they have
tried it and it worked successfully, the rule generally applicable in
weighing positive against negative testimony does not apply : Id.
STAMP.

Omission without E~idence of Intent-Where a party sues on an
instrument which is required by the Act of Congress of 13th of July
1866, to be stamped, upon penalty that such instrument "shall be
deemed invalid and of no effect," when the stamp is omitted, "with intent to evade the provisions" of the Act; and there is no evidence that
the plaintiff, in omitting the stamp, intended fraudulently to evade those
provisions, the instrument may be used in evidence: Black \'. Richardson, 39 31d.
STATUTE.

Constructive Repeal.-Where two acts provide remedies, differing only
in form, for the same substantial grievance, it would seem clear that the
le-islature intended by the later act to prescribe the only rules which
should govern in such cases: Iontel v. Consolidation Coal Co., 39 Md.
Semble, that even though two statutes relating to the same subject
be not, in termi, repugnant or inconsistent, yet if the later statute were
clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern in the
case provided for, it will be construed as repealing the first: l.
STREET.

See Highway; Municipal Corporation; Negligence.
SURETY.

Evidence-Discharge by Tender.-There was evidence tending to
show that L. was principal upon a note, and had deposited money which
had been tendered, to pay the same., and had agreed to indemnify the
defendant against the costs and expenses of a suit thereon. There was
also evidence tending to show that H., another signer, was principal,
and the defendant and L. sureties. The plaintiff requested the court
to charge that, the defendant being indemnified, L. was principal and
the defendant surety ; and the refusal to so charge was held no error:
Joslyn v. Eastman, 46 Vt.
When a debtor tenders payment of a debt for which a surety is ob-
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ligated, and the creditor declines to receive it, he thereby discharges the
surety: 11.
TORT.

Pleadihg- Joinderof Counts- Tort - Proximate Cause.- In an
action against a railroad company the decl:ration contained two counts
The first charged that the defendant, by its agents, so carelessly and
negligently drove and conducted its locomotives and ears, that sparks
and fire therefromn were dropped, blown, east and spread by burning, in
and upon plaintiffs' fences, trees, timiber, &c., whereby the same were
set fire to, burned and destroyed. The second averred in substance,
that the niirther of the plaintiffs, being seised of certain land, did, in
18132, by her deel, giant to the defiendant a right of way ;,hrough tie
same, .iilject to the condition that it should make and keep in repair
substantial fences between the railroad and her adjoining lands; under
which deed the defendant entered into and continued in tie enjoyment
of the said right of way, whereby it became and was its duty to perfbrm
all the conditions in said deed ; that the mother of tile plaintiffs died
in 1871, leaving then her sole heirs-at-law and seised of the same land,
but that, since that time, the defendant, in neglect of its duty, had
suffered said fences to be out of repair, by reason whereof plaintiffs'
land suffered from inroads of cattle, and their crops were destroyed, &c.,
whereby they sustained daniage. Demurrer to this declaration, on the
ground of misjoinder of counts, which was overruled, and, on appeal,
it was held : that both counts were in tort, and so properly joined:
Pkiladel hia, W & B. Railroad Co. v. Constable, 89 Md.
Where the law imposes upon a party an obligation which he neglects
to perform. whereby damiage results to another, the party injured may
bring an action on the case founded in tort : Id.
In an action against a railroad company, the defendant proved that a
fire, for which damages were claimed, began on a lot owned by one II..
immediately adjoining the railroad, and covered with broom-sedge and
dry grass ; that the fire burned across this lot, about one hundred and
fi' y yards, to the land of the plaintiffs, where it encountered a fence
and dry grass, and, spreading from these, destroyed ecitain young
timber, fences and fence rails on said land. lebl: 1st. That the fhet
that the fire was first communicated to the material on the land of the
adjacent proprietor, II., did not affect the defendant's responsibility
to the plaintiffs. 2d. That the fire injured the plaintiff-;' property in
its natural and direct course, and by naturally and gradually spie.ding
from the place where it began, without. any intervening fi,rce or power,
and the injury was, therefore, its proximate effect : Id.
TRUSTEE.
Failure to invest Funds-Chargeablewith Interest oaly.-When a
trustee receives iioney which lie should invest for the use and benefit
of his ccstuhs que trust, but fitils to do so, lie will be charged with only
simple interest. it not appearing that lie used the trust funds, or employed them in his business, or in any other way by which he could have
made gains: Smith & Barber, Ex'rs. v. Darby, 89 Md.

